City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Student Theses

John Jay College of Criminal Justice

Spring 6-2018

General Acceptance among Experts of Eyewitness Research
Findings: Sources of Influence
Sneha Suresh
CUNY John Jay College, sneha.suresh@jjay.cuny.edu

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/jj_etds/73
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

RUNNING HEAD: General Acceptance of Eyewitness Phenomena

1!

General Acceptance among Experts of Eyewitness Research Findings: Sources of Influence
Sneha Suresh
MA Forensic Psychology Thesis
John Jay College of Criminal Justice

RUNNING HEAD: General Acceptance of Eyewitness Phenomena

2!

Abstract
Recent advances in eyewitness identification research has been rapidly expanding with
emergence of new eyewitness phenomena. At the same time, the number of experts being call upon
to testify in court to the reliability of these various phenomena are also increasingly. For such
testimony to be admissible, it must meet various criteria of general acceptance established by the
courts. In the current study, 54 experts responded to a survey to assess the extent of their consensus
of general acceptance of various eyewitness phenomena, collect information on their demographics,
opinions regarding various other courtroom phenomenon and assess the impact of recent literature
on perceptions of reliability and general acceptance of the same phenomena. The findings revealed
that there are high levels of agreement amongst experts on a variety of topics such as Showups,
Blind Administration, Description Matched Lineup, Weapons Focus, Elderly Witness, High
Identification Confidence, Lineup Fairness and Change Blindness. Familiarity with various
eyewitness research publications was also noted to have an effect on expert’s perception of general
acceptance, assessments of reliability of eyewitness phenomena and willingness to testify in court.
The implications of these findings with regards to the development of eyewitness consensus and
expert testimony are discussed.
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Introduction
Due to the reconstructive and fallible nature of human memory, eyewitness identifications in
courtroom proceedings are often inaccurate (Cutler, Dexter & Penrod, 1989; Goodman & Hahn,
1987; Penrod, Loftus, & Winkler, 1982). For instance, the National Registry of Exonerations (2016)
attributes 30% of all wrongful convictions to erroneous eyewitness identifications, and the
Innocence Project (2014) attributes 75% of wrongful convictions, in their exonerations, to the same.
Furthermore, in State v Henderson (2011) the court stated “Study after study revealed a troubling
lack of reliability in eyewitness identifications. From social science research to the review of actual
police lineups, from laboratory experiments to DNA exonerations, the record proves that the
possibility of mistaken identification is real. Indeed, it is now widely known that eyewitness
misidentification is the leading cause of wrongful convictions across the country.” (p. 5). At the
same time, eyewitness identification has also been noted as critical to the apprehension and
prosecution of criminals and in the exoneration of innocent suspects (DOJ, 2017). Hence, in effort
to counterbalance the pros and cons, the criminal justice system has enforced several safeguards
designed to reduce false convictions resulting from mistaken identifications. Some such safeguards
include the use of blind procedures, where the administrator is not involved in the investigation and
does not know what the suspect looks like (e.g., Connecticut Public Act 08-1431), documenting the
witness’s self-reported confidence at the moment of the initial identification (Department of Justice,
2017) and jury eyewitness instructions (e.g., New Jersey v Henderson, 2011; US v Telfaire, 1972).
In practice, however, the usefulness of these safeguards are limited as corroborative evidence is
often lacking and effective cross-examination requires a certain degree of knowledge and
understanding of human memory (Walters, 1985). Simultaneously, psychological research has
demonstrated that laypersons, including police, attorneys, judges, and juries lack the required
(3) eyewitness identification procedures that, when practicable, use a double-blind administration wherein
the person conducting the identification procedure is not aware of which person in the photo lineup or live
lineup is suspected as being the perpetrator of the crime.
1
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knowledge about human memory processes to draw valid inferences about the accuracy of
eyewitness identification under various witnessing conditions (Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas &
Bradshaw, 2006; Brigham & Bothwell, 1983; Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1987; Cutler, Penrod, &
Stuve, 1988; Deffenbacher & Loftus, 1982; Noon & Hollin, 1987) and in some cases juries were
found to hold beliefs, about eyewitness phenomena, that were contrary to research findings and the
beliefs of experts in the field (Kassin & Barndollar, 1992). In light of the deficiencies of these
safeguards, courts have turned to the use of expert psychological testimony to educate the jury
about memory processes and the factors that potentially influence the memory of an eyewitness.
An expert witness must be qualified by the court before they can testify. In the U.S federal
system, the qualification of an expert witnesses is controlled by Rule 7022 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence (Garrett & Neufeld, 2009). Under this rule, a witness may qualify as an expert witness
based on knowledge, skill, experience, training or education. However, there is no explicit
requirement that must be met for qualification. That is, there is no training or degree specifically
required. It is at the judge’s discretion to act as a ‘gatekeeper’3 and determine whether the expert is
qualified to testify and whether the content of the testimony meets either the Frye4 or Daubert5
standards of expert testimony based on the information brought forward during vior dire. However,
there is no precisely prescribed procedure for this process leaving the concept of ‘generally
acceptable’ open to the interpretation of the judge who may have little to no knowledge on the topic
(Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1989). Hence, it is likely that without appropriate guidelines, aiding in

2

Fed. R. Evid. 702

Following Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. (1993) the U. S. Supreme Court granted trial
judges the power to act as gatekeepers with regard to the admissibility of expert scientific evidence.
3

Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). A court applying the Frye standard must determine
whether or not the method by which that evidence was obtained was generally accepted by experts in the
particular field in which it belongs.
4

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995) (1) whether the theory or
technique in question can be and has been tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and
publication; (3) its known or potential error rate; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling
its operation; and (5) whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community.
5
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outlining ‘general acceptance’ for expert testimony in court proceedings, wrongful convictions
might become difficult to prevent.
In their report, Garrett and Neufeld (2009) recollect that conventional wisdom once
encouraged the narrative that a sound defence and cross-examination would enable courts to
properly assess the strength of forensic evidence. However, the National Academy of Science report
unequivocally states, and clearly demonstrates with post-conviction DNA exonerations, that at least
in criminal cases, the courts have not functioned well as ‘gatekeepers’ of questionable scientific
evidence (West & Meterko, 2015), and given the lack of scientific knowledge among legal
practitioners and, more importantly, judges, “judicial review, by itself, will not cure the infirmities
of the forensic science community” (National Research Council, 2009, p. 12). Therefore, this
burden falls on the scientific community. Moreover, it can be argued that it is unfair to expect the
courts to sort through, or to assess for themselves the reliability of a device or technique outside of
the legal realm, no matter how widely used. Hence, it is essential that the validity of forensic
techniques be established within the respective scientific fields, before any particular piece of
evidence is considered in the adjudicative process. This includes establishing and defining, within
each field, including the field of eyewitness testimony, the various phenomena that are ‘generally
accepted’ by experts throughout the course of time. Hence, reaching a consensus among experts
about what they deem generally acceptable in the field of eyewitness testimony would aid, to a
large extent, in the judge’s decision making process and also in cross-examination by attorneys. The
current study aims to provide some reference to the courts regarding general acceptance of
eyewitness phenomena and throw some light on what influences expert opinions of generally
accepted eyewitness events.
Eyewitness Expert Testimony and the Judiciary
In order to truly assess the need for a consensus of eyewitness experts on various eyewitness
phenomena, it is important to look at the standing of the courts on the matter. Courts are noted to
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have inconsistently admitted expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications. While
the overwhelming majority of courts have excluded such expert testimony in the past (e.g., State v.
Chapple, 1983; Among federal courts, the Eleventh Circuit has been a proponent of the
exclusionary rule. See United States v. Holloway, 1992), they are being accepted more readily in
recent times (e.g., Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Walker, 2014; State v. Lawson, 2012; State v.
Henderson, 2011). Some frequently cited reasons for exclusion of expert eyewitness testimony
include questions regarding the general acceptance and reliability of eyewitness phenomena, the
argument that the information would not assist the trier of the fact, and concerns that eyewitness
expert testimony could be misleading, could overwhelm the jury or lead to a battle of experts
(Fradella, 2007; Stein, 2003; Woller 2003). Additionally, in their review of court rulings on the
matter, Schmechel, O'Toole, Easterly & Loftus (2006) found that the most commonly cited rationale
for excluding expert testimony was that it was “not beyond the ken” (p. 191) of the average juror.
Furthermore, in People v Radcliffe (2002), Judge William C. Donnino concluded that a proponent
of evidence for the admission of expert eyewitness testimony should explain whether the testimony
involves “novel scientific theories and techniques” (p. 6), and if it does, it should include an offer of
proof as to its general acceptance by the relevant scientific community.
In State v. Chapple (1983), the Arizona Supreme Court became the first in the nation to rule
that the judge abused his discretion in excluding expert testimony concerning eyewitness reliability
citing that the and proffered testimony was within the ken of the juror and that it would "take from
the jury their own determination as to what weight or effect to give to the evidence of the eyewitness” (p. ). Similarly, in People v McDonald (1984), where the prosecution’s case comprised
solely of eyewitness testimony, the court ruled that Dr. Robert Shomer’s testimony, regarding the
processes of perception and recall, would "usurp the jury's function” (p. 363) and also that the
phenomena was “not…scientific enough at this point in time” (p. 363). However, the supreme
court examined and rejected the trial judge’s grounds for exclusion and concluded that standard jury
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instructions would not be sufficient to convey the same sort of data that Dr. Shomer's testimony
would have provided.
More recently, in People v Lee (2001) the defense wanted to introduce the testimony of an
eyewitness expert regarding duration of an encounter, the passage of time, stress involved in an
encounter, assimilation of post-incident information and race, and absence of correlation between
eyewitness confidence and the accuracy of an identification. This was denied by two separate
Justices, after a Frye hearing, and both courts maintained that corroborative evidence was sufficient
for the jury to evaluate the eyewitness testimony. Upon appeal, The New York Court of Appeals
ruled that the decision to admit or exclude eyewitness expert evidence is at the discretion of the trial
court. The court stated that although “jurors may be familiar from their own experience with factors
relevant to the reliability of eyewitness observation and identification, it cannot be said that
psychological studies regarding the accuracy of an identification are within the ken of the typical
juror” (p. 10). This ruling is more in line with research. Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas &
Bradshaw (2006) examined a sample of jurors, judges and law enforcement professionals on their
knowledge of factors affecting eyewitness accuracy. They found participant responses differed
signiﬁcantly from responses of eyewitness experts. Jurors disagreed with the experts on 87% of the
issues, while judges and law enforcement disagreed with the experts on 60% of the issues. The
ﬁndings showed a large deﬁciency in knowledge of eyewitness memory amongst jurors, judges and
law enforcement personnel, indicating that the legal system may beneﬁt from expert assistance in
the evaluation of eyewitness evidence.
Unlike the typical rulings on the matter, in People v Smith (2002), Judge James A. Yates
denied the prosecution’s request for a Frye hearing to determine if the proffered expert eyewitness
testimony, concerning “stress, event violence, cross-racial impact, and exposure time that affect the
reliability and accuracy of eyewitness identification," (p. 21) and ruled in favor of expert testimony
stating that it was generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. In this case, the judge’s
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decisions was criticized by Fried (2018) for having relied solely on articles which had urged such
testimony, and not addressing the numerous studies, “whose methodologies, measurements and
conclusions were contested amongst the experts in the relevant scientific community” (p. 22) and
implicitly accepting its general acceptability. He further stated that while the New York court
decisions relied on by Smith included cases which had admitted similar testimony as beyond the ken
of the jury or for other reasons, perhaps implicitly finding general acceptability, there were no
explicit findings concerning general acceptability. Moreover, the previous New York cases which
had declined to admit such testimony generally did so on the ground that such evidence was within
the ken, thereby failing to make any findings on general acceptability.
Other key rulings include People v. LeGrand (2007) were the defense wanted to introduce
the testimony of an eyewitness expert regarding the effect of weapon focus, the lack of correlation
between witness confidence and accuracy of identification, the effect of post-event information on
accuracy and confidence malleability. The prosecution opposed the motion on the ground that the
theories that the defense wanted to introduce were "highly controversial” (p. 8). In State v
Henderson (2011) the court appointed a Special Master to evaluate scientific and other evidence
about eyewitness identifications. These factors included system variables like lineup procedures and
estimator variables like lighting conditions or the presence of a weapon. In this case, the court
concluded that the existing standard for assessing eyewitness identification evidence did not offer
an adequate measure for reliability, did not sufficiently discourage inappropriate police conduct and
that it also overstates the inherent ability of the jury to evaluate the testimony of eyewitnesses who
honestly believe in its accuracy. Having reviewed the Special Master’s report, the New Jersey
Supreme Court determined that if the defendant can show evidence of suggestibility, all system and
estimator variables relevant to the identification should be investigated at a pretrial hearing, and if
the prosecution demonstrates that the identification is still reliable, the identification should be
admitted. Furthermore, the court stated that upon admittance of the identification, the jury must be
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instructed on the research concerning the relevant system and estimator variables in order to help
the jurors evaluate the reliability of the identification. Furthermore, the court stated “We anticipate,
however, that with enhanced jury instructions, there will be less need for expert testimony.” (p.
126).
Interestingly, research into such jury instructions, including Henderson, suggest that they are
not very effective in aiding the jury (Papailiou, Yokum & Robertson, 2015; Cutler, Dexter &
Penrod, 1989; Cutler, Dexter & Penrod, 1990; Greene, 1988; Jones & Penrod, 2018; Jones, Bergold,
Dillon & Penrod, 2017; Dillon, Jones, Bergold, Hui & Penrod, 2017; Jones, Bergold, Dillon &
Penrod, 2017). On the other hand, research evaluating the effectiveness of eyewitness expert
testimony has been more optimistic (Devenport, Stinson, Cutler & Kravitz, 2002; Cutler, Penrod &
Dexter, 1989; Wells, 1983). For instance, Fredella (2006) quotes Cutler & Penrod (1995) “There are
now sound reasons to believe that jurors not only need [expert] testimony [on eyewitness
identification] but [that they] also benefit from it” (p. 29) and Loftus & Doyle (1997) “Recent
research ... suggests that while expert testimony is no panacea, it does enhance the quality of jury
deliberations” (p. 29) to shed light on the importance of expert eyewitness in the courtroom.
In Oregon v. Lawson (2012) the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that in situations in which the
defendant objects to the veracity of the the eyewitness testimony, the burden is on the prosecution to
show its validity. In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Walker (2014), the Appellant’s motion to
admit expert testimony on human recall, or to hold a Frye hearing was denied. The trial court relied
upon Pennsylvania case law which held that expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification
was inadmissible at the time. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court ruled “we hold that, in
Pennsylvania, the admission of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification is no longer
per se impermissible, and join the vast majority of jurisdictions which leave the admissibility of
such expert testimony to the discretion of the trial court.” (p. 1). Thus, reversing the order of the
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Superior Court, and remanding the matter to the trial court for reconsideration of such expert
testimony in the future including the possibility of a Frye hearing.
Given the court’s long-standing apprehension regarding what lies within the ‘ken of the
juror’ as well as what can be deemed scientifically accepted at the time, it would be helpful to have
an appraisal of experts on the matter. Specifically, considering jurisdictions under Frey and Daubert
standards, and expert consensus on ‘generally accepted’ eyewitness phenomena and an assessment
of the relationship between perceptions of reliability and quality of research available that influence
the formation of scientifically based opinions could surely aid the courts in their decisions.
Expert Eyewitness Consensus
The earliest effort to address the question of expert consensus of general acceptance was
spearheaded by Yarmey and Jones (1983). They had 16 eyewitness experts read hypothetical
situations that were designed to assess their opinions on a variety of topics. The experts were then
asked to choose one out of four statements that best described the likely outcome. The results of this
study revealed high levels of consensus on many topics. Unfortunately, as pointed out by Konecni
& Ebbesen (1986), Yarmey and Jones (1983) failed to address the perceived reliability of the
findings as the experts were not provided with an alternative response that enabled them to
characterize the effects as weak, unreliable, or mixed.
Kassin, Ellsworth and Smith (1989) conducted a more focused research attempting to
explore and document expert consensus on eyewitness phenomena that are ‘generally acceptable’.
They compiled a list of experts by searching the various eyewitness literature published in scientific
journals between 1980 and mid-1986 and surveyed them regarding their opinions on a list of 21
eyewitness related topics. Their research established that there does indeed exist a consensus
amongst eyewitness experts about ‘acceptable’ phenomena. They found a strong consensus of 80%
on the research data on various phenomena (wording of questions, lineup instructions, misleading
post event information, the accuracy-confidence correlation, attitudes and expectations, exposure
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time, unconscious transference, showups, and the forgetting curve) were reliable enough to be
presented in court. Furthermore, over 70% of the experts also endorsed lineup fairness, the tendency
to overestimate the duration of events and the cross-race identification bias among White witnesses.
Most eyewitness experts who had testified reported to have done so on behalf of criminal
defendants. They also reported they would be just as likely to consent for the prosecution as for the
defense. Moreover, they reported to be more likely to agree to testify in civil cases than in criminal.
Concerning their role in court, most respondents indicated that their main objective is to educate the
jury, and that juries are more competent with the aid of experts than without.
The former study was updated with a very similar latter study by Kassin, Tubb, Hosch and
Memon (2001) where they surveyed sixty-four psychologists about their courtroom experiences and
opinions on 30 eyewitness phenomena. In light of Daubert ruling in 1993, they also asked
respondents to indicate for each item whether their opinion was based on published, peer-reviewed,
scientific research and found 80% consensus among experts about sufficiently reliable eyewitness
phenomena that could be presented in court. These phenomena involved the wording of questions,
lineup instructions, confidence malleability, mug-shot-induced bias, post event information, child
witness suggestibility, attitudes and expectations, hypnotic suggestibility, alcoholic intoxication, the
cross-race bias, weapon focus, the accuracy-confidence correlation, the forgetting curve, exposure
time, presentation format, and unconscious transference. Additionally, the results also indicated that
these experts set high standards before agreeing to testify.
The findings form Kassin, Tubb, Hosch and Memon (2001) survey has been acknowledged
by the courts (e.g., New Jersey v. Henderson, 2011; People v Legrand, 2002; People v Williams,
2006). Specifically, People v Legrand (2002) and People v Williams (2006) acknowledge its
usefulness in the testimony of Dr. Malpass regarding the relationship between confidence and
accuracy since its publication. However, the main issue cited by both these courts regarding the
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survey, and also acknowledged by the authors, was its low response rate of 34% which is a weak
representation of eyewitness experts.
Daftary and Penrod (2012) conducted a similar study in two waves; the first in 2007 and the
second in 2012 and reports a useable response rate of 79% for the first wave and 55% for the
second wave. A comparatively stronger representation of eyewitness experts. A primary goal of
Daftary and Penrod (2012), for both waves, was to assess expert’s familiarity with a number of
research studies that included primary research and meta-analyses, on various eyewitness
phenomena, and the impact of these research articles on their opinions of general acceptance and
willingness to testify. A secondary goal was to provide an update to Kassin, et al. (2001). Both goals
focused on topic areas in which substantial research had been completed since 2001 and where
there might be a detectable shift in opinions amongst experts in the field. Consistent with previous
research, they found a high consensus among experts regarding reliability of eyewitness
Phenomena. The study also found that the level of expertise of experts, determined by the number
of publications and their testifying experience, were more willing to testify to the various
phenomena in court. Additionally, experts who rated the research in a particular area as being of
high quality and generally reliable were more willing to deem the phenomena as generally
acceptable in the field and to testify in court. Strong correlations between ratings of general
acceptability (“generally reliable” or “very reliable”) and willingness to testify were also found.
Specifically, of those experts who rated a phenomenon as very reliable 97% were willing to testify
to it in court, and for those who rated a phenomenon to be generally reliable 89% were willing to
testify to the phenomenon in court. Interestingly, experts who were more familiar with metaanalyses regarding various phenomena were noted to rate those phenomena as more reliable, as
compared to those who were unfamiliar with the phenomena in question (e.g. mugshot induced
bias, unconscious transference, presentation format, and stress). Notably the results suggest a
substantial increase in requests to testify as well as a decline in acceptance rates. Hence, Daftary
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and Penrod (2012) suggest the possibility that experts are receiving more requests than they can
handle. Additionally, experts citied lack of time, perceived level of incompetence on the particular
area, or moral and ethical reasons for declining to testify.
The current study aims to update Daftary and Penrod (2012) for the third wave by
incorporating new phenomena and published research articles that have not been surveyed before.
This wave will focus on meta-analyses and most-cited recent articles and their influence on expert
opinion formation. This will provide a reference for courts regarding research phenomena that have
come about in the recent past and also provide scholars with insight into the familiarity and
influence of different types of research articles.
The Current Study
In a recent opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
went noted that “in the ten years since the Kassin study, the consensus that the study of eyewitness
identification is a reliable field of research has continued to grow.” (p. 30; Tillman v State, 2011).
Indeed, the field of eyewitness research has arguably made significant advances in recent years
since the initial surveys (Kassin, Ellsworth & Smith, 1989; Kassin, Tubb, Hosch & Memon, 2001;
Daftary & Penrod, 2012) of eyewitness experts. There have been a number of new eyewitness
phenomena that have come to light, new published research articles and meta-analyses which could
potentially impact experts’ perceptions of various eyewitness phenomena since the previous survey.
Additionally, phenomena previously surveyed that yielded low consensus where new publications
are available could also benefit from an update on expert consensus. These include research on
description matched lineup (Fitzgerald, Price, Oriet & Charman, 2013), elderly witnesses
(Erickson, Lampinen & Moore, 2016), lineup fairness (Fitzgerald, Price, Oriet & Charman, 2013;
Fitzgerald, Oriet & Price, 2015), presentation format (Palmer & Brewer, 2012), showups
(Neuschatz, Wetmore, Key, Cash, Gronlund & Goodsell, 2016; Wetmore, Neuschatz, Gronlund,
Wooten, Goodsell & Carlson, 2015), weapons focus (Fawcett, 2013; Kocab & Sporer, 2016), blind
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administration (Charman & Quiroz, 2016), change blindness (Fitzgerald, Oriet & Price, 2016), own
gender bias (Rhodes & Anastasi, 2012) and high identification confidence (Wixted & Wells, 2017).
An updated survey of this nature can greatly assist judges in determining the quality of available
eyewitness research, as well as its general acceptance in the scientific community. Furthermore, in
light of findings from Daftary & Penrod (2012) further exploring expert’s familiarity of metaanalysis and its influence on their opinion formation could allow for a better understanding of
expert’s appraisal of available research and possibly aid in the production of better research
material. Furthermore, this could also throw some light on the emergence of consensus, expanding
our knowledge and understanding of the same.
Methods
Participants
The survey involved the initial list of experts with locatable emails compiled for the first
two waves by Daftary and Penrod (2012). This included a list of 100 experts known to the authors
of Daftary and Penrod (2012) based on prior published research compiled and was supplemented
with names generated in a search of PsycINFO for eyewitness-related research published from 2001
to June 2007 (n=399 articles) for the first wave, and 20 additional authors, who met the same
selection criteria, for the second wave. For the third wave recent research articles were culled for
additional names (of senior authors where it was possible to make this determination) which
brought the total number of contacts to 175, 19 of which were returned as undeliverable—13 more
recent email addresses were located among that group for a total of 169 solicitations.
Respondents were sent an email requesting their participation with a link to the survey. The
survey was hosted on a secure website (www.qualtrics.com), and all responses were kept
confidential.
Materials
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A survey designed after the Daftary and Penrod (2012) survey instrument was used. The
survey contained two questions regarding their participation in the 2007 survey (yes/no) and the
2012 survey (yes/no), 11 statements concerning eyewitness phenomena (see table 1), respondent
ratings for perceived influence of scientific research on jury verdicts for each phenomenon, 11
demographic questions (involving qualifications, areas of expertise, number of articles published
and courtroom experience) and 11 questions on article familiarity and influence on expert decision
making (“how familiar are you with this article listed below?” and “to what extent did the above
mentioned study influence your perception of the reliability of the relationships evaluated above
(note that if, for example, you were already quite convinced about the reliability of a phenomenon,
a new, confirming study might have little effect)”). For the 11 statements concerning eyewitness
phenomena, respondents were asked to rate their beliefs regarding the reliability of a number of
statements related to the 11 eyewitness phenomena on a 7 point Likert scale (based on Kassin, et al.
1989) that included (1) “evidence suggests the reverse is possibly true”, (2) “evidence does not
support it”, (3) “evidence is inconclusive”, (4) “evidence tends to favour it”, (5) “evidence is
generally reliable”, (6) “evidence is very reliable” and (7) “I don’t know". Respondents were asked
to indicate whether they thought the phenomenon was reliable enough to present in courtroom
testimony (yes/no) , whether they would be willing to testify to the reliability of the phenomenon
(yes/no), whether their opinions were based on peer reviewed published research (yes/no), and
finally they were asked for their opinions regarding whether “most jurors believed the statement to
be true as a matter of common sense.” (yes/no). Experts were also asked to rate, on a 9 point Likert
scale ranging from not at all to extensively, to what extent they think jury verdicts are influenced
by a serious consideration of each of the 11 phenomena. Expert opinion on an appropriate effect
size to reflect reliable findings in a study were also enquired for Pearson’s r (r ranging from -1 to 1)
and for Cohen’s d (d ranging from 0 to 2).
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Table 1. Eyewitness phenomena and corresponding statements
Phenomena

Statement

Retained from Daftary and Penrod (2012)
Description Matched
Lineup

The more the members of a lineup resemble a witness's description
of the culprit, the more accurate an identification of the suspect is
likely to be

Elderly Witness

Elderly witnesses are less accurate than younger adults

Lineup Fairness

Greater suspect similarity in a lineup tends to produce more more
discriminating eyewitness judgments

Presentation Format

Sequential lineups produce more discriminating identifications
when compared to simultaneous lineups

Showups

The use of a one-person showup instead of a full lineup increases
the risk of misidentification

Weapons Focus

The presence of a weapon impairs an eyewitness's ability to
accurately identify the perpetrator’s face

Blind Administration

Procedures wherein the lineup administrators does not know the
identity of the suspect reduces false identifications

Change Blindness

Change blindness can lead to false identification of innocent
bystanders

2017 Survey Only
Own Gender Bias

Witnesses are more accurate with same gender identification

Own Age Bias

Witnesses are more accurate in recognising suspects within their
own age range

High Identification
Confidence

There is a strong positive correlation between confidence and
accuracy

Experts were asked additional questions regarding their courtroom experience: the estimated
number of times they have been asked to testify, the number of times they agreed to testify, and the
number of times they actually testified. Reasons for not testifying based on responses from Daftary
and Penrod (2012) were also included in the survey (I'm not interested, I don't have time / it is too
time consuming, it is too much of a hassle, I don't feel I have sufficient depth or breadth of
knowledge in the field, the science is not strong enough in this field, I do not testify regardless of
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the case, I am involved only in research, I have never been asked to testify, I do not approve of
specific court procedures in this area and other (please specify)).
Participants were asked a number of professional demographic questions and questions
concerning their background. They were also asked to indicate the highest graduate degree they had
obtained, their primary area of specialization, and professional memberships. Additionally, they
were asked to indicate scholarly achievements related to the area of eyewitness research, such as
peer-reviewed journal articles, law review articles, books, book chapters, magazine and newsletter
articles and other.
Respondents were asked to specify how often they had been called in criminal and civil
cases and by which side (i.e. the prosecution or the defense). They were also asked a few general
follow-up questions patterned on Kassin et al. (2001) and Daftary and Penrod (2012): (1) “What do
you see as the primary role of the eyewitness expert: to educate the jury, assist a particular party, or
other (please specify)?” and (2) “In general, would you say that juries are better equipped to
evaluate eyewitness testimony with or without the aid of a competent expert (or is there no
difference)?”
Finally, respondents were asked to assess the impact of selected research articles published
between 2012 and 2017, on their judgments of reliability of research publications. Publications
chosen represented some of the recent research with preference for meta-analysis, where available,
and larger number of citations. For each article, experts were asked to indicate their familiarity and
level of influence on their opinion of reliability (To what extent did the above-mentioned study
influence your perception of the reliability of the relationships evaluated above (note that if, for
example, you were already quite convinced about the reliability of a phenomenon, a new,
confirming study might have little effect).
Procedure
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In order to produce data on expert consensus and assemble an acceptable list of phenomena
for the survey, some phenomena, where expert consensus varied in the past, were retained (repeat
phenomena; change blindness, elderly witness, lineup fairness, presentation format and showups)
from Daftary and Penrod (2012) survey and new phenomena, that had not been surveyed before
were added (own gender bias, own age bias and high identification confidence). The process for
selection and elimination of phenomena from Daftary and Penrod (2012) was based on (1) retaining
phenomena that had varied responses for reliability ratings and eliminating phenomena that had
mostly high or mostly low reliability ratings (2) prioritizing retaining phenomena where a new-meta
analysis has been published since 2012 and consensus of general acceptance was not previously
established. This was done to avoid a repeated survey of phenomena where general acceptance had
already been established and was unlikely to change (as no contradicting research of significance
was found to have surfaced) and assuming that the emergence of a new meta-analysis would aid in
establishing consensus where consensus had previously varied.
The new eyewitness topics selected for the study were chosen from areas of eyewitness
research in which there had arguably been significant new research reported since Daftary and
Penrod (2012), and where there might be a detectable shift in opinions amongst experts in the field
based on the emergence of some contradicting research in areas where notably high consensus is
known to have not been achieved among experts (change blindness and its effects on eyewitness
testimony for instance). However, due to the emergence of a number of new eyewitness phenomena
since 2012 and the inability to survey them all, a more restrictive approach was adapted.
Phenomena were chosen with preference for those that had a recent meta-analysis published. A
PsychInfo search with the phrase “eyewitness meta-analysis” was done to obtain a list of metaanalyses published between 2012 and 2017. Phenomena with a meta-analysis were given preference
over other phenomena for several reasons (1) the findings from Daftary and Penrod (2012) suggest
meta-analysis were more influential when compared to primary research articles (2) a substantial
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amount of research and interest in the area would be required for the emergence of a meta-analysis
in the particular area of research (3) meta-analysis could be considered a possibly influential source
of research in the development of expert opinions as it often condenses the findings of several
primary research studies to produce an arguably more-rounded conclusion. Overall, 11 phenomena
were assembled (8 retained from Daftary and Penrod (2012) and 3 new phenomena).
A PsychInfo search was then performed for each phenomenon (restricting the search to
articles published since 2012) which produced a list of several articles. Meta-analysis, where
available, were selected for each phenomenon with preference given to articles with high citation
counts. Articles that were cited more often were retained and articles that were cited less often were
eliminated. Citation count was used in the selection process to ensure a fair comparison between the
expert’s familiarity with the article and its influence over their reliability ratings of the 11
phenomena tested in the survey (it was reasoned it would be more likely that respondents would
recognize articles that were cited more often than those that were cited less often).
The respondents were sent an email requesting their participation with a link to the survey.
The survey was not randomized as the statements introducing the phenomena and its corresponding
ratings had to be quarried before the articles were presented to ensure that the respondents were
familiar with the statements for each phenomenon. A brief explanation about the study and its
potential uses were provided and consent was obtained through a ‘yes, I consent’ and ‘no, I do not
consent’ options. The survey was anonymous and required approximately of 28 minutes to
complete. A total of 54 usable responses were received, yielding a response rate of 31.95%.
Results
The Experts
Of the 54 experts who responded to the questions regarding participation in the pervious two
surveys and also rated various questions regarding the 11 eyewitness phenomena, 2 had only
participated in 2007 survey (Wave I of Daftary & Penrod, 2012), 11 had only participated in the
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2012 survey (Wave II of Daftery, 2012), 8 participated in both surveys (Wave I and Wave II of
Daftary & Penrod, 2012) and 28 in neither of the previous two surveys.
Among the 44 experts who completed the demographic section, 43 held Ph.D.’s and 1 held
D.Sc. The respondents listed their primary areas of specialisation as eyewitness identification
(34%), memory (20%), cognitive psychology (16%), eyewitness memory (11%), social psychology
(9%), eyewitness testimony (6%), and miscellaneous other areas (jury decision making, psychology
and law, investigative psychology, child and elderly witness). Furthermore, experts reported having
professional memberships with APLS (43%), APA (29%), SARMAC (17%), APS (11%) and other
organisations (CPA, Psychomonics, BPS, EAPL and ANZAPPL). On average, the 45 experts who
responded to the questions regarding their scholarly achievements had published 25.73 scientific
journal articles (n=1,132; 13.22 in Kassin, et al., 2001 and 30.71 in Daftary & Penrod, 2012), 3.70
Law review articles (n=163; 1.42 in Kassin, et al., 2001 and 4.89 in Daftary & Penrod, 2012), 1.36
books (n=60; 2.15 in Kassin, et al., 2001 and 3.21 books in Daftary & Penrod, 2012), 8.64 book
chapters (n=380; 6.54 in Kassin, et al., 2001 and 9.97 in Daftary & Penrod, 2012), 1.27 magazine
articles (n=56; 5.38 in Kassin, et al., 2001), 0.64 newsletter articles (n=28; 5.38 in Kassin, et al.,
2001) and 1.30 other publications (n=57). Experts seem to have produced more publications in
Daftary & Penrod (2012; M=12.19) than in the current survey (M=9.85), However this difference
was not statically significant, t(6)=.084, p=.790. Respondents also reported reading an average of
30 eyewitness related articles and attend an average of 2 conferences a year.
In addition, many of the respondents reported being actively involved in the judicial system.
Eighty two percent had been asked to testify as eyewitness experts on at least one occasion, an
estimated average of 98.84 times. Overall, the sum of reported numbers was 4,133 (at least; with a
maximum report of 1000+ and minimum of 0 times; n=1 and 8 respectively). Daftary and Penrod
(2012) reported an overall 2,719 at Wave I and 4532 at wave II. In cases where experts were asked
to testify, they agreed an estimated 77% (78% in Kassin, et al., 2001 and 66% in Daftary & Penrod,
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2012) of the time and actually testified 64% of the time (92% in Kassin, et al., 2001 and 88% in
Daftary & Penrod, 2012). Overall, experts reported involvement in 91% criminal cases (n=2,512;
93% 74% for defense only, 4% for prosecution only and 22% reported involvement for both sides
on different occasions) and 9% civil cases (n=262; 69% for plaintiff only, 15% for defendant only
and for both sides). Kassin et al. (2001) reported 93% involvement in criminal and 7% involvement
in civil cases. Daftary and Penrod (2012) reported 96.8% involvement in criminal and 46% in civil
cases. Both Kassin et al. (2001) and Daftary and Penrod (2012) also reported similar
disproportionate requests by the defense and prosecution in criminal proceedings. Furthermore,
expert testimony was admitted in court an average of 46% of the time when the attorney actively
sought testimony. Reasons given by respondents for not testifying included “ I'm not
interested” (8%), “I don't have time / It is too time consuming” (49%), “It is too much of a
hassle” (18%), “I don't feel I have sufficient depth or breadth of knowledge in the field” (18%),
“The science is not strong enough in this field" (13%), “I do not testify regardless of the case, I am
involved only in research” (5%), “I have never been asked to testify” (10%), “I do not approve of
specific court procedures in this area” (3%) and others notable reasons involved the expert
testimony being unnecessary or not beneficial to the case and scheduling conflicts (5% in both
cases). For the first 11 responses, the options did not allow multiple response and hence
respondents were unable to check more than one reason for not testifying. In some cases, the
respondents provided the additional reason(s) in the text response box provided for “other reasons”
in the survey. These responses were made note of while calculating the overall percentages for each
option.
Ninety three percent (n=40; 77% and n=49 in Kassin, et al., 2001) of the respondents reported
that the primary role of the expert was to educate the jury and 7% (n=3; 5% and n=3 in Kassin, et
al., 2001) reported that it was to assist a particular party. Additionally, experts whose country did
not have a jury system reported that their main role was to educate the judge or the court. Sixty four
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percent of experts believe that expert testimony is helpful to the jury while evaluating eyewitness
testimony. Moreover, experts were significantly more likely to be willing to testify in court when
they regarded a phenomena as reliable enough to be presented in a courtroom, and less likely to be
willing to do the same when they reported the phenomena was not reliable enough to be presented
in a courtroom; r(44) = .903, p < .001. Interestingly, their willingness to testify (“Would you be
willing to testify in court that this phenomenon is reliable?”; M=12.20, SD=4.50) and likeliness to
regard a phenomena as reliable enough (“Do you believe the phenomenon is reliable enough for
psychologists to present it in courtroom testimony?”; responses summed across phenomena;
M=12.20, SD=4.49) was not influenced by their overall courtroom experience (sum of number of
times they were asked to testify, agreed to testify and actually testified; M=201.61, SD=525.35);
r(44) = .04, p < .776 and r(44) = .065, p < .676 respectively. Similarly, expert’s opinions regarding
phenomena being reliable enough for psychologists to present in court was also not influenced by
their research productivity (sum of all reported publications; M=42.64, SD=53.13) ; r(44) = -.286, p
< .060. However, expert’s willingness to testify was significantly negatively correlated to their
research productivity, r(44) = .342, p < .023. Experts with higher research productivity were more
willing to testify than those with lower research productivity. Hence, these results suggest that
expert opinions on reliability of phenomena is independent of their courtroom experience and
research productivity. Expert’s willingness to testify on the other hand, while independent of
courtroom experience, is influenced by their research productivity. The individual phenomena
ratings for reliability and willingness to testify are reported in table 2.
Self assessed expertise (research productivity and courtroom experience combined) as a
whole, yielded non-significant influence over reliability and willingness to testify; r(44)=.015, p<.
924 and r(44)=.029, p<.851 respectively. These results were dissimilar with those revealed by
Daftary and Penrod (2012) at Wave I where respondents with more expertise were found to be more
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Table 2. Expert ratings of phenomena reliability, willingness to testify and scientific bases for
opinion.
Eyewitness Phenomena

Is it reliable
enough?

Would you
testify?

Based on scientific
research?

Description Matched Lineup

83 (73)

74 (71)

98 (85)

Elderly Witness

74 (65)

69 (50)

76 (98)

Lineup Fairness

70 (65)

62 (58)

83 (85)

Presentation Format

51 (72)

49 (72)

93 (98)

Showups

96 (82)

85 (74)

98 (94)

Weapons Focus

81 (92)

80 (88)

83 (98)

Blind Administration

96 (86)

87 (82)

85 (93)

Change Blindness

61 (54)

57 (45)

84 (79)

Own Gender Bias

18

12

63

Own Age Bias

46

33

74

High Identification Confidence

73

68

82

Note. Numbers represent percentage of affirmative responses.
Numbers in parenthesis for phenomena queried by Daftary and Penrod (2012) represent
percentage of affirmative responses by experts surveyed in 2012.
likely to endorse general acceptance of eyewitness phenomena (β =.28, S.E. = 1.50, 95% C.I. [.15, .
40], p < .01), and more willing to testify (β = .14, S.E. = .20, 95% C.I. [.12, .15], p < .05).
Judgments of Eyewitness Phenomena
The reliability ratings ranging from the 11 phenomena were compiled and their acceptance
ratings are reported in table 3 with the corresponding ratings from the two waves of Daftary and
Penrod (2012). Overall, 54 experts responded to this section of the survey. Consistent with the
findings of Kassin et al. (2001) and Daftary and Penrod (2012), the results suggest that there does
exist a general consensus among experts regarding eyewitness phenomena.
Experts were asked two questions regarding their beliefs about what is within the ken of the
jury: (1) they were asked to state their opinions regarding the extent to which they thought jury
beliefs about each of the 11 phenomena statements to be true as a matter of common sense on a
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scale ranging from 0-“Jurors do not believe the above statement to be true” to 100- “Jurors believe
the above statement to be true” and (2) they were asked to indicate to what extent they thought jury
verdicts were influenced by a serious consideration of each of the 11 eyewitness phenomena on a
scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extensively). The mean distribution of (1) and (2) for each
phenomenon are reported in table 4.
Table 4. Mean expert ratings for perceived ‘ken’ of jury.
True as a matter of
common sense?*

Jury verdicts influenced
by a serious
consideration?**

Description Matched Lineup

47.66

2.80

Elderly Witness

63.27

5.07

Lineup Fairness

47.95

4.44

Presentation Format

27.08

2.75

Showups

39.68

3.64

Weapons Focus

41.79

4.29

Blind Administration

38.82

3.22

Change Blindness

24.95

2.29

Own Gender Bias

35.22

2.60

Own Age Bias

40.46

3.00

High Identification Confidence

71.59

8.91

Phenomena

* rated on scale ranging from 0=“Jurors do not believe the above statement to be true” to
100=“Jurors believe the above statement to be true"
** rated on a scale ranging from 1=“not at all” to 9=“extensively”
Experts were also noted to have based their opinions of phenomena reliability (“Do you
believe the phenomenon is reliable enough for psychologists to present it in courtroom
testimony?”), willingness to testify (Under the right circumstances, would you be willing to testify
in court that this phenomenon is reliable?) and general acceptance of phenomena on their
scientifically based opinions (“Is your opinion in this matter based on published, peer reviewed,
scientific research?”); rs (486)=.402, p < .001, rs (486)=.400, p < .001 and rs (486)= .109, p < .017.
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That is, they were more likely to deem a phenomena reliable enough and testify regarding the
phenomena in court when they believed their opinions were based on scientific research and likely
to find the phenomena not reliable enough and be unwilling to testify when they believed their
opinions were not based on scientific research. A similar relationship was found between general
acceptance of phenomena with expert’s willingness to testify; rs =(487)= -.385, p < .001.
Judgements of Appropriate Effect Size for Reliable Research Findings
Respondents were asked to indicate their expected appropriate effect size that reflects
reliable findings in a study for Pearson’s r and for Cohen’s d (“ What would you expect to be a
appropriate effect size to reflect reliable findings in a study?”). Overall, for Pearson’s r expert’s
reported 0.30 and 0.40 (n=7, 17.4% in both cases) to be the most appropriate effect size. Expert
judgements of effect size for Cohen’s d was more varied with the most ratings for 0.50 and 0.60
(n=5, 12.5% in both cases). The rating distribution for both are reported (depicted) in fig 1 and fig
2.
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Impact of Familiarity and Influence of Current Research on General Acceptance, Willingness to
Testify and Reliability for Courtroom Presentation.
Binary logistic regression analysis was applied to analyze the relationship between the
predictor variables of expert familiarity and influence ratings of research articles to three different
outcome variables: (1) their opinions of general acceptance of eyewitness phenomena, (2)
willingness to testify that the phenomena is reliable in a courtroom and (3) whether the phenomena
is reliable enough to be presented in a courtroom. For the outcome variable “Please indicate the
reliability of the following statement”, for each phenomena, the responses “evidence suggests the
reverse is possibly true”, “evidence does not support it”, “evidence is inconclusive”, “evidence
tends to favor it” and “I don’t know” were coded as 0 and “evidence is generally reliable” and
“evidence is very reliable” were coded as 1. For expert’s willingness to testify and whether the
phenomena is reliable enough to be presented in a courtroom, “yes” responses were coded as 1 and
“no” responses were coded as 0. The predictors were entered into the model through forced entry.
Results of the binary logistic regression indicated that there was a significant association
between influence and familiarity ratings with each of the outcome variables; X2 (2, 386)= 12.495, p
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< .002 with general acceptance, χ2(2, 386) = 8.606, p < .014 with reliability and χ2(2, 386) =
17.462, p < .001 with willingness to testify. The overall accuracy of classification for general
acceptance was 58% (!R 2=.043), for reliability rating classification was 70% accurate (!R 2=.031) and
65% for willingness to testify (!R 2=.061). The model percentage accuracy in classification for
general acceptance, reliability and willingness to testify suggests that impact of familiarity and
influence on each of the outcome variables is accurate no more than 58%, 71% and 65%
respectively.
In each case, familiarity significantly contributed to the model; p < .010, β= .116 and 95%
CI [1.028, 1.227] for general acceptance, p < .049, β= .098 and 95% CI [1, 1.216] for reliable
enough to be presented in a courtroom and p < . 007, β= .131and 95% CI [1.037, 1.252] for
willingness to testify. The results suggest that as familiarity increases by one unit, the odds of
phenomena being deemed generally accepted increases by 12.3% (OR = 1.123), reliability increases
by 10.3% (OR=1.103) and willingness to testify by 14% (OR=1.140). Influence ratings on the
other hand, had a non-significant impact on general acceptance, reliability and willingness to testify
(p < .907, p < .855 and p < .715 respectively). Table 5 reports the familiarity and influence ratings
for each article. Overall, experts seemed to be more familiar with primary articles than with meta
analysis but rated meta-analysis articles more influential on their perceptions of reliability.
Additionally, familiarity and influence ratings were highly correlated suggesting that familiarity
with an articles had an effect on expert’s appraisal of the article’s influence; r (396)= .400, p < .001.
What is Reliable Enough?
To determine how reliable a topic must be before an eyewitness is willing to testify, each
respondent's opinion of a phenomenon was compared with their judgment of whether the
phenomenon was reliable enough to be presented in court, and whether they would be willing to
testify to the reliability of the particular phenomenon. Table 5 reports the expert opinions for
reliability, willingness to testify and scientific bases for opinion for each phenomenon (with Daftary
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Table 5. Expert familiarity and influence ratings of eyewitness articles.
Article

Familiarity

Influence

68

4.76

50

3.98

61

4.67

66

3.83

73

4.48

59

3.43

48

3.33

18

2.15

Wixted & Wells (2017)**

50

4.08

Overall Meta-Analysis Rating

50

3.61

Overall Primary Article Rating

60.75

2.99

Description Matched Lineup
Fitzgerald, et al (2013)*
Elderly Witness
Rhodes & Anastasi (2012)*
Show-ups
Wetmore, et al (2015)**
Weapons Focus
Fawcett, et al (2013)*
Blind Administration
Charman & Quiro (2016)**
Change Blindness
Fitzgerald, Oriet & Price (2016)**
Own Gender Bias
Herlitz & Lovén (2013)*
Own Age Bias
Rhodes & Anastasi (2012)*
High Identification Confidence

* Meta-analysis, **Primary article
Familiarity indicates percentage of experts who were familiar with the articles.
Influence indicates mean rating for each article.
Ratings of article influence on experts' perceptions of reliability was measured on a scale ranging
from 1 = “did not impact my perceptions of reliability” to 9 = “significantly enhanced my
perceptions of reliability”
2012 results reported in parentheses). Overall, experts were consistent in their evaluations. That is,
experts were willing to testify 16% of the time when they rated the phenomena as inconclusive
(10% in Wave I and 12% in Wave II of Daftary & Penrod, 2012), 87% when generally reliable and
97% when very reliable (97% in Wave I and 98% in Wave II of Daftary & Penrod, 2012).
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Discussion
This study set out to (1) assess the extent of general acceptance of various eyewitness
phenomena within the scientific community (2) collect information on expert demographics and
opinions regarding various other courtroom phenomenon and (3) assess a number of new
eyewitness research publications that have come to the fore since the last wave of Daftary and
Penrod (2012) survey, which could potentially impact expert’s perceptions of various eyewitness
phenomena. Additionally, the survey queried experts about their opinions on various matters
involving demographics, research productivity, courtroom involvement and perceptions of the
jury’s understanding and consideration of various eyewitness phenomena.
The respondents in the current study were notably less accomplished than those involved in
Daftary and Penrod (2012) but seemingly more accomplished than Kassin, et al. (2001) when
scholarly achievement through publications were compared. However, courtroom experience was
comparable to Daftary and Penrod (2012) with a similar percentage of experts being asked to testify
at least once. However, larger percentage of respondents reported that they agreed to testify but
fewer percentage of respondents reported that they actually testified in court. A dissimilar trend was
noticed when comparing the percentage of times experts agreed to testify in court and the
percentage of times they actually testified between Kassin, et al. (1989) findings, Kassin, et al.
(2001), and Daftary and Penrod (2012). In previous comparisons, there was a decrease in rates of
experts agreeing to testify and increase in rates of them actually testifying. It is possible that experts
are either more open to testifying or that their perceptions of phenomena reliability, in light of new
meta-analysis (see Daftary & Penrod, 2012) for repeat phenomena, has improved and hence
rendered them more open to testifying in court regarding them. There are also a few possible
explanations for the decrease in actual testimonies. One explanation could be that experts who
participated in the current survey were newer to the field with lesser experience actually testifying.
Since courts seem to factor an individual’s previous testifying experience while attempting to
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establish expertise (Henderson & Lenz, 2009), some respondents probably did not make the cut and
hence did not actually testify. It it also worth noting that many of the respondents reported
scheduling conflicts as a reason for being unable to testify. Hence, they probably agreed to testify
but may have been unable to due to scheduling conflicts. A more troubling, but equally plausible
explanation, could be that though experts are accepting requests to testify at a higher rate, courts are
admitting fewer eyewitness expert testimonies (e.g., In Commonwealth v. Selenksi, 2016, the court
held that “although it is no longer banned, per se, expert testimony concerning the reliability of
eyewitness identification was properly excluded when that identification was not the sole or
primary evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” p. 1). Additionally, attorneys might have become more
aware of issues surrounding eyewitness accounts and hence seek consultations in more cases. These
consultations were probably sought out during discovery phases and the consultations may not
ultimately result in court appearances. This could probably be due to the testimony appearing less
helpful than expected or due to the emergence of other evidence that renders the testimony less
relevant or useful. Another possible explanation for these finings could be that a growing
percentage of cases (95% to 97% of criminal cases as reported by Alkon, 2017) involving
consultations ultimately end in plea bargains rather than ending up at trial and the consultations
with experts may or may not play a role in those plea bargains.
The ratio of criminal and civil requests was also consistent with those reported by Kassin et al.
(2001) as was the disproportionate percentage of requests from the defense and prosecution
reported by the two previous waves (Darfaty, 2012; roughly twice as many requests for criminal in
all three studies). Similarly, the number of requests from the plaintiff in civil cases was considerably
higher than requests from the defendant in the current study. Interestingly, in one, the burden of
proof lies with the non-requesting party (prosecution) and in the other, it lies with the party
pursuing expert testimony (plaintiff).
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A majority of experts (93%) reported that the primary role of the expert was to educate the
jury. Of those who reported that the expert’s primary role was to provide assistance to a particular
party (7%), none of them had actually testified in court. One respondent reported “I wish to avoid
'hired gun' scenarios due to the nature of my research” as a reason for declining to testify suggesting
a moral conflict though reportedly believed that the purpose of the testimony was to assist a
particular party and another reported that it was their duty to assist the judge as their deciding
country did not have a jury system probably referring to the judge as the party they believed the
expert’s role was to assist. Moreover, these results were strikingly similar to those collected in 2001
by Kassin, et al. Furthermore, reasons provided for other roles of experts in a courtroom were also
consistent (eg: “to educate…judge”). This suggests that the beliefs held by experts on the topic has
remained consistent for over 17 years.
Experts were more willing to testify when they deemed a phenomenon as reliable enough
and were not willing to testify if they thought the phenomenon was not reliable enough to be
presented in court by psychologists. Such testifying behavior was also recorded in the previous
surveys. Experts were also noted to be more willing to testify when they deemed a phenomenon
generally reliable or very reliable and less likely to do the same when they deemed a phenomenon
inconclusive. These findings have remained consistent through the Kassin, et al. survey in 2001,
Daftary in 2012 and the in the current study. Furthermore, expert opinions regarding general
acceptance, reliability and willingness to testify were highly correlated to the basis of their opinions
on published, peer reviewed, scientific research. These findings are important as the admissibility
standards set by the courts employing Daubert (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1995)
require the phenomena in question to have been subjected to peer review and publication and also
to have attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community. Hence, given that
eyewitness experts are willing to testify most often when they consider the evidence highly reliable
and seem to base their appraisal of reliability on peer reviewed and published scientific information,
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this could ease the burden on the judiciary to some extent. Furthermore, this could also help bring
some resolution to the question of of how reliable a body of research must be before it is presented
in the court as experts consistently (in all four surveys) indicate willingness to testify largely when
they deem the phenomena in question to be reliable enough for such purposes.
Similar to the experts surveyed in Kassin et al (2001) and Daftaty (2012), experts surveyed
in this wave were not influenced by their courtroom experience and research productivity regarding
their opinions of phenomena reliability. Also consistent with Kassin (2001), courtroom experience
was not an influential factor on expert’s willingness to testify while expert’s research productivity
was correlated with their willingness to testify. Specifically, experts with higher research
productivity were more willing to testify than those with lower research productivity. A likely
explanation for this could be that experts involved with more research were probably more familiar
with eyewitness related phenomena and hence were more confident about testifying in court
regarding the various phenomena. Experts less involved in eyewitness research were probably less
familiar with the phenomena queried and hence less confident and likely to testify regarding the
various phenomena. On the other hand, research productivity was not influential on phenomenon
reliability ratings (consistent with Kassin, et al., 2001 findings). This suggests that, irrespective of
their own courtroom experience and research productivity, there is a general consensus among
experts regarding their opinions about eyewitness phenomena and whether it is reliable enough for
psychologists to testify to in court. This is useful as courts require this level of general consensus
among scientists.
Experts were also queried on topics regarding their opinions about the ken of the jury.
Overall, experts did not believe that jury verdicts were influenced by a serious consideration of
many of the phenomena queried. Phenomena such as Elderly Witness and High Identification
Confidence received above average ratings while the rest of the phenomena received below average
ratings. This suggests that experts do not opine that the various eyewitness phenomena examined in
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this study are entirely within the ken of the jury. On many occasions, such as in State v. Chapple
(1983), expert eyewitness testimony was excluded as the court ruled that the theories in question
were within the ken of the jury. Though expert opinions do not establish with absolute certainty the
boundaries regarding the ken of the jury, it could nevertheless prove helpful as a reference to the
courts.
Experts displayed greater consensus regarding acceptance on topics such as Showups, Blind
Administration and Change Blindness when compared to the second wave of Daftary and Penrod
(2012). Other phenomena such as Lineup Fairness, Elderly Witness, Weapons Focus and
Description Matched Lineup did not see much change in consensus. Additionally, none of the
experts reported “I do not know” for Presentation Format, Shows, Weapons Focus, Blind
Administration, Change Blindness and High Identification Confidence. Furthermore, there was a
strong consensus regarding the reliability of various eyewitness phenomena: Showups, Blind
Administration, Description Matched Lineup, Weapons Focus, Elderly Witness, High Identification
Confidence, Lineup Fairness and Change Blindness. Other phenomena such as Presentation Format,
Own Age Bias and Own Gender Bias yielded lower consensus. The current wave also attempted to
record eyewitness expert’s appraisal of appropriate effect size that reflects reliable findings in a
study for Pearson’s r and for Cohen’s d. Expert’s seemed to reach some consensus on the
appropriate Pearson’s r which fell within a narrower range but was more varied on their opinions
regarding the appropriate Cohen’s d to reflect reliable findings in a study.
Experts were asked to rate a number of articles regarding their familiarity with the articles
and their perceived extent of its influence on their judgements of reliability of the eyewitness
phenomena evaluated by the articles. Inconsistent with the findings from the first two waves of
Daftary and Penrod (2012), experts were found to be more familiar with primary articles than with
meta-analysis. This could probably be attributed to the nature of phenomena addressed by the
articles. Most of the primary articles addressed well-researched phenomena while most of the meta-

RUNNING HEAD: General Acceptance of Eyewitness Phenomena

3! 5

analyses addressed new phenomena. It is plausible that the repeat phenomena have been a topic of
interest among the research community for longer periods of time and hence were more familiar
with these articles. However, influence ratings of articles were consistent with the findings from the
previous two waves conducted by Daftary and Penrod (2012). It should be noted that overall, metaanalysis articles had higher citation counts when compared to primary articles which may reflect
their higher influence ratings.
Unlike the findings form Daftary and Penrod (2012), influence ratings were not influential
on expert’s general acceptance of phenomena, reliability ratings or willingness to testify. A possible
explanation for this unexpected lack of effect could be that the meta-analysis used in the study, that
reflect higher influence ratings, were sufficiently new with regards to publication dates or in topic
novelty making it too early for a strong general consensus to have formed among the respondents.
Additionally, as the familiarity and influence ratings were highly correlated, it is also possible that
this lack of effect was partly driven by the varying levels of familiarity with the topic which could
have impacted the influence ratings. Furthermore, this was also reflected in the influence ratings of
the individual articles with only two articles, both of which had comparably higher citation counts,
scoring an average influence rating above 4.5 on an influence scale ranging from 1 (“not al all”) to
9 (“extensively”). Familiarity on the other hand, seemed to have an impact on expert’s appraisal of
general acceptance, reliability ratings of phenomena and willingness to testify. These were also
reflected in the familiarity ratings of the individual articles with 4 articles receiving scores above
the average 50 on a familiarity scale ranging from 0 (“did not impact my perception of reliability”)
to 100 (“significantly impacted my perception of reliability”). These findings were consistent with
those from the two waves of Daftary and Penrod (2012).
There are a few limitations of the study, the most notable being a low response rate of
31.95% comparable to the response rate of 34% recorded by Kassin, et al. (2001). In
acknowledgement of the low response rate, the list of experts solicited were also quarried about
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possible reasons for not participating in the survey. They were asked 3 questions: “I did not
participate in the survey because (check all the apply)” with a list of possible reasons: “lack of
time”, “length of survey”, “inconvenient timing of participation request”, “do not consider myself
an expert int he field”, “plan on participating at a more convenient time”, “not interested” and room
for other reasons (2) “I started the survey and chose to discontinue because (enter reason below)”
and (3) “what improvements could be made to encourage your participation?”. Of the 10 responses
received for (1), 6 respondents did not consider themselves experts in the field, 2 reported the
reason as the length of the survey (one of whom further included “too long” as a reason for starting
and choosing to discontinue the survey) and 2 reported other reasons that included “I am highly
interested. But all the questions are solely relevant in a legal system as the USA…”. Notable
reasons for starting and discontinuing included “I lack confidence...needed to brush up and check
on the latest findings…” and “Many of the questions referred to recent findings and I was not
qualified to give valid responses.”. These responses suggest that experts acknowledged the need for
expertise on the topics surveyed, wanted to provide fully informed responses and those that were
unable to do so probably refrained from participation. Additionally, they were asked for suggestions
to encourage participation and respondents suggested similar reasons as those for not participating
such as the length of the survey and clarification regarding participant confidence levels “ How
confident do you want your respondents to be?”. Altering the length of the survey is a challenging
as all questions included on the survey are relevant and important to for the aims of the study.
Confidence on the other hand could be problematic to define in the context of expertise. High
confidence levels might discourage participation and low confidence levels might yield inaccurate
responses. Furthermore, perceived self-confidence might not be an actual representation of
knowledge and expertise.
The experts surveyed were not a comprehensive list of all experts in the field. However, an
attempt was made to identify researchers who are currently active for solicitation of responses to the
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survey in addition to those who participated in the previous two waves of Daftary and Penrod
(2012). It is also plausible that some experts in the field were not contacted via the methodology
used in this study. Additionally, all the data collected by the survey are based on self-report leaving
room for the possibility that some respondents may have over-estimated or even under-estimated
certain occurrences such as their research publications, courtroom experience, familiarity with and
influence of the literature surveyed. The scope of this study was restricted to expert testimony
regarding eyewitness phenomena. Research into similar expert consensus in other domains of
psychological phenomena (such as expert testimony on earwitness, battered woman syndrome, rape
trauma, etc.) would also make similar contributions. Such research could also assess the sources of
influence on expert opinion in the respective fields. As experts were disproportionately involved in
criminal and civil cases, future research could also look more closely into the role of eyewitness
expert testimony in both cases.
Conclusion
The present study revealed some important consistencies and some changes in the opinions
of eyewitness experts. Expert’s perception and management of their activity in the courtroom
indicated that they set relatively high standards for their own involvements as respondents were
willing to testify mostly when they deemed a phenomena as "generally reliable" and "very reliable.”
Furthermore, reliability and willingness to testify seemed to be independent of respondent expertise
level while expert’s willingness to testify was influenced by their research productivity. High levels
of agreement amongst experts on a variety of topics such as Showups, Blind Administration,
Description Matched Lineup, Weapons Focus, Elderly Witness, High Identification Confidence,
Lineup Fairness and Change Blindness was also recorded. Familiarity with various eyewitness
research publications seemed to have an effect on expert’s perception of general acceptance,
assessments of reliability of eyewitness phenomena and willingness to testify in court. The present
results should provide needed guidance to judges in their decision as gatekeepers, the courts in
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seeking information on the acceptance of novel research areas, lawyers in their examination of
eyewitnesses and psychological experts in determining which phenomena are reliable enough to
present in court and also in understanding the sources that influence consensus formation. This
should alleviate some of the issues surrounding the admission of expert testimony in the courtroom.
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